Stare decisis is no more an inexorable command for administrative agencies than it is for courts (see, Wachtler, Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals, 59 St. John's L.Rev. 445, 452).(FN2) They are, therefore, free, like courts, to correct a prior erroneous interpretation of the law (Matter of Pascual v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 79 A.D.2d 1054, 1055, 435 N.Y.S.2d 387, lv. denied 54 N.Y.2d 601, 442 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 425 N.E.2d 901; Matter of Leap v. Levitt, 57 A.D.2d 1021, 395 N.Y.S.2d 515, lv. denied 42 N.Y.2d 807, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 368 N.E.2d 45) by modifying or overruling a past decision (see, Davis, Administrative Law Secs. 20:10-20:11 [2d ed]; Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, at 587-588). They are, likewise, free, like courts, to determine how disputed facts are to be decided, judging credibility and drawing such inference as they find reasonable in order to resolve contested questions of fact (Matter of McSweeney v. Hammerlund Mfg. Co., 275 App.Div. 447, 450, 90 N.Y.S.2d 347; see, Matter of Dresher [Lubin], 286 App.Div. 591, 146 N.Y.S.2d 428; Gabrielli and Nonna, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in New York: An Overview and a Survey, 52 St. John's L.Rev. 361, 363; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions of Law, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 239, 241), and it is not within the power of the courts to impose factual consistency.

     The policy reasons for consistent results, given essentially similar facts, are, however, largely the same whether the proceeding be administrative or judicial -- to provide guidance for those governed by the determination made (Matter of Howard Johnson Co. v. State Tax Commn., 65 N.Y.2d 726, 727, 492 N.Y.S.2d 11, 481 N.E.2d 551); to deal impartially with litigants; promote stability in the law; allow for efficient use of the adjudicatory process; and to maintain the appearance of justice (Davis, Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Decisions, 59 W.Va.L.Rev.111, 128-136). The underlying precept is that in administrative, as in judicial, proceedings "justice demands that cases with like antecedents should breed like consequences" (id., at 117; accord, Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 Admin.L.Rev. 407, 424; Kramer, Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28 Fordham L.Rev. 1, 8). Legislative awareness of the policy considerations involved is evident from Labor Law Sec. 534, the third unnumbered paragraph of which requires that the Board "maintain a current index, by topic, of the principles of law established by the decisions rendered by the board and the courts concerning matters arising under [the Unemployment Insurance Law]" and make copies of the index available for public inspection and examination at all locations where unemployment insurance hearings are conducted.(FN3)

     From the policy considerations embodied in administrative law, it follows that when an agency determines to alter its prior stated course it must set forth its reasons for doing so. Unless such an explanation is furnished, a reviewing court will be unable to determine whether the agency has changed its prior interpretation of the law for valid reasons, or has simply overlooked or ignored its prior decision (Kramer, op. cit., at 68-70). Absent such an explanation, failure to conform to agency precedent will, therefore, require reversal on the law as arbitrary, even though there is in the record substantial evidence to support the determination made ( Matter of Howard Johnson Co. v.State Tax Commn., 65 N.Y.2d at p. 727, 492 N.Y.S.2d 11, 481 N.E.2d 551, supra; Matter of New York Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 62 N.Y.2d 57, 62, 476 N.Y.S.2d 60, 464 N.E.2d 428; Matter of Dresher [Lubin], 286 App.Div. at p. 594, 146 N.Y.S.2d 428, supra; Matter of Fitzgerald v. State Div. of Dept. of Public Serv., 262 App.Div. 393, 397, 29 N.Y.S.2d 9; see, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-808, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 2374-75, 37 L.Ed.2d 350 [plurality opn]; Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. Federal Communications Commn., 444 F.2d 841, 852, cert. denied 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 2233, 29 L.Ed.2d 701, 4 Davis, Administrative Law Sec. 20:11, at 37 [2d ed]; Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening, 45 NYU L.Rev. 201, 204, 209).
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FN2. Indeed, it is often suggested that such an agency "has somewhat greater freedom than a common-law court" (Matter of Dresher [Lubin], 286 App.Div. 591, 594, 146 N.Y.S.2d 428; see, FoodMktg. Inst. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 587 F.2d 1285, 1290; Davis, Administrative Findings, Reasons and Stare Decisis, 38 Cal L Rev 218; Davis, Doctrine of Precedent As Applied To Administrative Decisions, 59 W Va L Rev 111, 124; Ann., 79 ALR2d 1126, 1131-1132; 2 NY Jur 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 146, at 230).

FN3. Although the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is not covered by the State Administrative Procedure Act (Sec. 102[1]), that act likewise requires that each agency governed by the act "maintain an index by name and subject of all written final decisions, determinations and orders rendered by the agency in adjudicatory proceedings", make the index and the text of any such decision available for public inspection and copying, and index each decision within 60 days after it is rendered (State Administrative Procedure Act Sec. 307[3][a]).

     It is well settled that "[a] decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reason for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Charles A. Filed Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 N.Y.2d 516, 517, 498 N.Y.S.2d 111, 488 N.E.2d 1223 [1985]).

     In Matter of Lincoln Stor. (Hartnett) (156 AD2d 832, supra), the Appellate Division concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's determination that Lincoln drivers were employees. In Matter of Lafayette Stor. & Moving Corp. (Hartnett) (156 AD2d 871, supra), however, in concluding that the drivers were independent contractors and not employees, the Board failed to comply with our decision in Matter of Field Delivery Serv. (Roberts) (66 NY2d 516). Although there are distinctions between this case, Matter of Lincoln Stor., and Matter of Lafayette Stor. & Mov. of Niagara (Appeal Board Dec 335, 353, Sept. 20, 1982 [Lafayette (Niagara)]), there exist "sufficient factual [similarities]" (Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], supra,
at 521) between the cases to require explanation by the Board as to why it determined that the drivers in Lincoln Stor. and Lafayette (Niagara) were employees but concluded that the drivers in Lafayette were independent contractors. As we noted in Field Delivery (supra, at 516-517), "[a] decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reason for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious." That the Appellate Division attempted to differentiate the drivers in Lafayette (Niagara), from those in the two cases here is unavailing for it is the Board, not the court, which must comply with Field Delivery if the facts in the cases are sufficiently similar. "[After]-the-fact rationalization [by the court] of the Board's determination does not satisfy the requirements of Field Delivery" (Matter of Martin [Troy Publ. Co. -- Roberts], 70 NY2d 679, 681).

     Supreme Court granted the petition, stating

     Absent a reasoned explanation for abandonment of the State Social Services Department's expressed original reading of the regulation at the time of promulgation and adoption here of a diametrically opposite interpretation, the agency's change of position was arbitrary and capricious and cannot stand.

     The DOH has in previous cases found that payments made in cash for home care are reimbursable if agency affidavits signed by the home care attendants are submitted as proof of payment (see Matter of App. of GS, DOH Dec. FH # 3864203J, Feb. 14, 2003; Matter of App. of MG, DOH Dec. FH # 3834019J, Dec. 27, 2002). Whether or not there is substantial evidence, "[a]bsent an explanation by the agency, an administrative agency decision which, on essentially the same facts as underlaid a prior agency determination, reaches a conclusion contrary to the prior determination is arbitrary and capricious" and must be annulled (Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, 518, 488 N.E.2d 1223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 111; see Matter of Aliperti v Trotta, 35 AD3d 854, 827 N.Y.S.2d 274). Here, the signed affidavits of the two home health care aides should be considered by HRA on the issue of reimbursement, in light of the DOH's prior acceptance of such evidence. Accordingly, so much of the determination dated August 30, 2006, as confirmed that part of the determination dated January 3, 2005, relating to those two home health care aids must be annulled, and the matter remitted to HRA for a recalculation of the reimbursement due to the petitioner. However, with respect to the attendant for whom the petitioner did not have a signed affidavit, there was substantial evidence to support the respondents' determination and that determination is consistent with prior determinations.

[W]e agree with the Supreme Court that the State Commissioner violated the principles of administrative stare decisis when he failed to adhere to his previous determinations, which admittedly are in conflict with his present decision, and failed to provide an explanation therefor. It was proper to remit the matter to the State Commissioner for an explanation (see, Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516; see also, Matter of Martin [Troy Publ. Co.-Roberts], 70 NY2d 679).